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Since Nash’s work in the early 1950’s, there have been two diﬀerent but
complementary approaches to analyzing bargaining problems: the strategic
approach and the axiomatic approach. This paper attempts to contribute to
the understanding of bargaining using the axiomatic approach.
Nash (1950) suggested a bargaining solution and characterized it with a
set of axioms in his seminal work on axiomatic bargaining theory. Among
these axioms, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) has been the
source of considerable contention since it predicts the same bargaining out-
come even when a substantial proportion of the alternatives that are favorable
to one bargainer are removed. In order to address this problem, other so-
lutions have been suggested for Nash’s bargaining problem, including Kalai
and Smorodinsky’s (1975) solution, which is characterized by the same set of
axioms used by Nash with the replacement of IIA by the axiom of individual
monotonicity. However, as we shall see in this paper, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution does not fully address the problem.
In this paper, we distinguish the relevant part of the alternatives from
the irrelevant for each bargaining problem. We compare bargaining solutions
with partial orders based on the size of the set of alternatives relevant to
the determination of the solution outcome. We show that although most
well-known bargaining solutions, including the Nash solution and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution, do not use all the alternatives, there are numerous
solutions that “depends on all the alternatives” (DAA). So, the new axiom
DAA that requires all the alternatives to be inﬂuential to the bargaining
outcome is an opposite extreme of IIA.
We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions that depend on averages
of all the alternatives and call them average alternative solutions. If we
present Nash’s bargaining problem to people in the street and ask them
what kind of solution they suggest, it is plausible to expect that many of
them would hint at settling the bargaining problem at some position in the
middle or at the average position. The average alternative solutions formalize
this intuition. We show that the average alternative solutions satisfy an even
stronger axiom than DAA, and characterize them by combining a certain
monotonicity axiom with the standard axioms used by the Nash solution
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
An astonishing result we ﬁnd is that the Nash solution and the Kalai-
1Smorodinsky solution can be obtained as limits of average alternative solu-
tions, although they are quite diﬀerent from average alternative solutions in
their constructions. Naturally, this ﬁnding leads us to provide alternative
characterizations of the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we deﬁne the class of bargaining
problems and solutions that we study. In Section 3, we introduce orders
on bargaining solutions, and the axiom of DAA. In Section 4, we introduce
the average alternative solutions, and characterize them. In Section 5, we
show limits of a certain class of average alternative solutions, and provide
alternative characterizations of the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. In Section 6, we conclude.
2 Preliminaries
Let S be a subset of I R
2, the 2-dimensional Euclidean space and d a point
in S. A two-person bargaining problem is a pair (S;d), satisfying the
following assumptions (i)-(v).
(i) There is at least one element u 2 S such that u À d.1
(ii) S is convex.
(iii) S is compact.
(iv) (S;d) is d-comprehensive, i.e., if u 2 S and u ¸ v ¸ d, then v 2 S.
These are standard assumptions in the literature on bargaining. The ﬁrst as-
sumption enables the bargaining to prove worthwhile to all bargainers. Con-
vexity is justiﬁable under the usual assumption of expected utility with an
introduction of some randomization device. Comprehensiveness is achieved
with free disposal. We add one more assumption on (S;d).
(v) u ¸ d for all u 2 S.
1We use subscripts to denote the elements of a vector so that ui means i ¡ th element
of u. We use the following notation for the comparison of two arbitrary vectors u and v:
u ¸ v means ui ¸ vi for all i; u > v means u ¸ v and u 6= v; and u À v means ui > vi for
all i.
2Since the bargainers always have the option to disagree, we disregard indi-
vidually irrational utility pairs (u 6¸ d) and assume all the alternatives are
individually rational.
Whenever (S;d) satisﬁes (i)-(v), we call S the set of alternatives and d
the disagreement point. The collection of all such (S;d) is denoted by Σ. A
bargaining solution, or simply a solution is a function F : Σ ! I R
2 such
that F(S;d) 2 S for all (S;d) 2 Σ. We shall use the term solution to refer to
the function F, and the term solution outcome to refer to F(S;d), the value
of the function F at a speciﬁc bargaining problem (S;d).
We deﬁne the set of weakly Pareto-optimal alternatives WPO(S) and the
set of strongly Pareto-optimal alternatives SPO(S) as follows:
WPO(S) ´ fu 2 S :6 9v 2 S such that v À ug;
SPO(S) ´ fu 2 S :6 9v 2 S such that v > ug:
We say that a function ¿ : I R
2 ! I R
2 is an aﬃne transformation if ¿(u) =
(®1u1 +¯1;®2u2 +¯2) for some real numbers ®1;®2 > 0 and ¯1;¯2. For a set
of alternatives S, ¿(S) ´ fv : v = ¿(u);u 2 Sg. We use ¿i to denote an aﬃne
transformation from I R
2 to I R
2 that transforms only the i-th component. So,
¿1 is a horizontal transformation and ¿2 is a vertical transformation in I R
2.
We call a bargaining solution classical whenever it satisﬁes the axioms of
WPO and SI deﬁned in the following, and denote the family of such solutions
by Φ.
² Weak Pareto-Optimality (WPO): F(S;d) 2 WPO(S).
² Scale Invariance (SI):
F(¿(S);¿(d)) = ¿F(S;d) for all aﬃne transformations ¿.
We denote the family of the classical solutions satisfying a stronger axiom
SPO (as in Tijs and Peters (1985)) by Φ¤. So, Φ¤ ½ Φ.
² Strong Pareto-Optimality (SPO): F(S;d) 2 SPO(S).
The axiom of scale invariance is also referred to as “independence of equiv-
alent utility representations” in the literature. Thanks to the axiom of scale
invariance, we assume without loss of generality that d = 0. Abusing nota-
tion slightly we use S instead of (S;0), and F(S) instead of F(S;0). We also
use Σ to denote the collection of all bargaining problems S. The assumption
3of d = 0 means that we do not need to consider shift parameters ¯’s for aﬃne
transformations of bargaining problems.
The following are additional notations that we shall use frequently in this
paper. I R+ denotes the set of nonnegative real numbers and I R
2
+ denotes
f(u1;u2) 2 I R
2 : (u1;u2) ¸ (0;0)g. Given f¢g 2 I R
2
+, convf¢g denotes the
convex hull of f¢g: it is the smallest convex subset of I R
2
+ containing f¢g.
Given f¢g 2 I R
2
+, cchf¢g denotes the convex comprehensive hull of f¢g: it is
the smallest convex comprehensive subset of I R
2
+ containing f¢g.
Thomson (1994) provides a recent comprehensive survey of the literature
on the axiomatic models of bargaining. He lists and explains all the well-
known solutions. We use N, K, Rd, PM, and EA to denote the Nash
solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the discrete Raiﬀa solution (Raiﬀa
(1953), Luce and Raiﬀa (1957)), the Perles-Maschler solution (Perles and
Maschler (1981)), and the area monotonic solution (Anbarci (1993), Anbarci
and Bigelow (1994)) respectively.2
We use Di and D¤
i to denote the dictatorial solutions. In this paper, we
use hi(S) to denote maxfui 2 I R : u 2 Sg, and h(S) ´ (h1(S);h2(S)). We use
li(S) to denote maxfui 2 I R : uj = hj(S);u 2 Sg. For a bargaining problem
S, D1 assigns (h1(S);0), D2 assigns (0;h2(S)), D¤
1 assigns (h1(S);l2(S)), and
D¤
2 assigns (l1(S);h2(S)).
All of the above solutions are elements of the family of classical solutions
Φ.
3 Relevance of Alternatives
We begin this section by stating two well-known axioms.
² Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):
If T µ S and F(S) 2 T, then F(T) = F(S).
² Individual Monotonicity (IM):
If T ¶ S and hj(S) = hj(T) for j 6= i, then Fi(T) ¸ Fi(S).
2We use the same notations for all of these solutions as Thomson (1994) does, except
the area monotonic solution. We use EA instead of A, for it is also referred to as the equal
area solution, and reserve the use of A for average alternative solutions that we introduce
later.
4The Nash solution satisﬁes IIA, and de Koster et al. (1983) described all
the solutions in Φ¤ satisfying IIA. They are fF t : t 2 [0;1]g, where F 0 = D¤
2,
F 1 = D¤
1, and F t(S) = argmaxu2S ut
1u
1¡t
2 for t 2 (0;1). It can be shown
that D1 and D2 are the only additional solutions in Φ satisfying IIA. Each
of the IIA solutions can be viewed as an arbitrator’s choice rule based on his
single-person preference on the space of the bargainers’ utilities regardless of
the bargaining problems.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisﬁes IM. Peters and Tijs (1985) de-
scribed all the solutions in Φ¤ satisfying IM by the monotonic curve, and
showed that the two dictatorial solutions, D¤
1 and D¤
2 are the only solutions
in Φ¤ satisfying both IM and IIA. We explain the monotonic curve brieﬂy.
Let F be any solution in Φ¤ satisfying IM. The monotonic curve ¸F is a
mapping of [0;1] into convf(1;0);(1;1);(0;1)g, deﬁned as
¸F(s) = F(cchf(1;s);(s;1)g):
The monotonic curve ¸F(s) is a continuous mapping, and ¸F(s0) > ¸F(s)
for any s0 > s. Consider only bargaining problems S with h(S) = (1;1)
thanks to SI of F. Then F(S) is the unique point of SPO(S) lying on
f¸F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g.
Consider a bargaining problem S 2 Σ. For any T 2 Σ which is a subset of
S and a superset of cchfN(S)g, the Nash solution outcome remains the same
because of IIA. For example, let S be cchf(1;0);(0;1)g. Then, N(S) = (1
2; 1
2),
and any bargaining problem which is a subset of cchf(1;0);(0;1)g and a su-
perset of cchf(1
2; 1
2)g yields the same outcome. Figure 1 panel (a) shows one
such bargaining problem T ´ cchf(1;0);(1
2; 1
2)g. Although the bargaining
position of player 2 is considerably weaker compared to the original bargain-
ing problem, the outcome remains the same. This was the main source of
criticism on Nash’s IIA.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is an alternative solution to address the
problem by replacing Nash’s IIA with the axiom of IM. However, it is also
subject to a similar criticism. Consider a bargaining problem S 2 Σ. For any
T 2 Σ which is a subset of S and a superset of cchf(h1(S);0);K(S);(0;h2(S))g,
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution outcome remains the same. For example, let
S be cchf(u1;u2) ¸ (0;0) : u2
1 + u2
2 = 1g. Then, K(S) = ( 1 p
2; 1 p
2), and any
bargaining problem which is a subset of cchf(u1;u2) ¸ (0;0) : u2
1 + u2
2 = 1g
and a superset of cchf(1;0);( 1 p
2; 1 p
2);(0;1)g yields the same outcome. Fig-




2 = 1g [ f(0;1)g]. Although the bargaining position of player

































(b) Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, K
Figure 1: Relevance of Alternatives
This observation leads us to consider the issue of the relevance of alter-
natives. Observing that all the alternatives of the bargaining problem are
not necessarily used to determine the solution outcome, we distinguish the
relevant part of the alternatives from the irrelevant for each bargaining prob-
lem. We now deﬁne formally the set of relevant alternatives of a bargaining
problem for a solution.
6definition Let F be a bargaining solution in Φ. We ﬁrst ﬁnd all the
bargaining problems T 2 Σ which satisfy F(S0) = F(S) for any S0 2 Σ
such that T µ S0 µ S. Among these bargaining problems, we select the
bargaining problems which are minimal with respect to set inclusion. The
set of relevant alternatives of a bargaining problem S 2 Σ for F is deﬁned
as the union of these minimal bargaining problems. We denote it by SF.
Notice that for most well-know bargaining solutions, SF is also a bargain-
ing problem.
Now that we have deﬁned the set of relevant alternatives, we compare
bargaining solutions in Φ in terms of the size of the set of relevant alternatives.
An equivalence relation
r =, a partial order
r




definition For solutions F and G in Φ,
² F
r = G if
RR
SF du1 du2 =
RR





SF du1 du2 ¸
RR
SG du1 du2 for all S 2 Σ.
² F
r
> G if F
r
¸ G but not F
r = G.
The expressions F
r = G, F
r
¸ G, or F
r
> G should not be confused with
F(S) = G(S), F(S) ¸ G(S), or F(S) > G(S), which are comparisons of
solution outcomes. The following example shows why
r
> is only a partial
order, and not a linear order.
example Consider two bargaining solutions in Φ: the Nash solution N
and a solution F that assigns the element of WPO(S) with u1 = 3
4h1(S) for
any bargaining problem S 2 Σ. Consider two bargaining problems: S ´
cchf(1; 1


























Now, we are ready to introduce a new axiom termed “dependence on all
alternatives”.
7² Dependence on All Alternatives (DAA): SF = S.
Thus, all the solutions in Φ satisfying DAA are in the equivalence class under
r =. If we regard IIA as an extreme, DAA is an opposite extreme of IIA.
For any solution F 2 Φ, we have F
r




SDi du1 du2 =
0 for all S 2 Σ. If F 2 Φ satisﬁes DAA, then F
r
¸ G for any G 2 Φ not sat-
isfying DAA. We show in the following three propositions (Propositions 3.1 -
3.3) some interesting results on the ordering of well-known solutions accord-
ing to the strict partial order.
Noting that a solution F 2 Φ satisﬁes IIA if and only if SF = cchfF(S)g,
we provide comparisons among the IIA solutions.
Proposition 3.1 Let F 0 = D¤
2, F 1 = D¤




for t 2 (0;1). Then, F t0 r
< F t for 0 · t0 < t · 1
2 or 1 ¸ t0 > t ¸ 1
2.
Proof. For a given bargaining problem S 2 Σ, SFt is cchfF t(S)g. Therefore,
Z Z
SFt





For any bargaining problem S 2 Σ, this quantity is maximized when t = 1
2
(Nash solution). Furthermore, F t0
1 (S)F t0
2 (S) · F t
1(S)F t
2(S) (with the equality
holding if and only if F t0(S) = F t(S)) for 0 · t0 < t · 1
2 or 1 ¸ t0 > t ¸ 1
2.
Now, we turn to the comparison of the solutions satisfying IM. It is easy
to see that for a solution F 2 Φ¤ satisfying IM,
SF µ cchf(h1(S);0);F(S);(0;h2(S))g:
In Lemma 3.1, we describe SF for any solution F 2 Φ¤ satisfying IM, using
the concept of the monotonic curve. We assume without loss of generality
h(S) = (1;1) thanks to SI of F.
Let ˆ u1(S;F) denote maxfu1 : (u1;u2) 2 f¸F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g;u2 = F2(S)g
and ˆ u2(S;F) denote maxfu2 : (u1;u2) 2 f¸F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g;u1 = F1(S)g.
Lemma 3.1 For any bargaining solution F 2 Φ¤ satisfying IM and for any








8Proof. Note that either ˆ u1(S;F) = F1(S) or ˆ u2(S;F) = F2(S). Suppose
ˆ u1(S;F) = F1(S) and ˆ u2(S;F) 6= F2(S) (see Figure 2). Then for any bargain-
ing problem S0 µ S with F(S) 2 S0, h1(S0) = 1, and
F2(S)
ˆ u2(S;F) · h2(S0) · 1,
we can ﬁnd ¿2 so that h2(¿2(S0)) = 1 and F(¿2(S0)) = (F1(S);¿2(F2(S))). By
applying the inverse transformation of ¿2, we obtain F(S0) = F(S). How-
ever, for any bargaining problem S0 µ S with F(S) 2 S0, h1(S0) = 1, and
h2(S0) <
F2(S)
ˆ u2(S;F), we have F1(S0) > F1(S). For any bargaining problem
S0 µ S with F(S) 2 S0, h1(S0) < 1, and h2(S0) = 1, we have F2(S0) > F2(S).
The proof is similar for the case ˆ u1(S;F) 6= F1(S) and ˆ u2(S;F) = F2(S),





































Figure 2: Set of Relevant Alternatives
Therefore, if ¸F(s0) À ¸F(s) for any s0 > s, as is the case for the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution, then
SF = cchf(h1(S);0);F(S);(0;h2(S))g:












du1 du2 for some symmetric S 2 Σ:
(2) There is no bargaining solution F 2 Φ¤ satisfying IM, such that F
r
> G
for any other bargaining solution G 2 Φ¤ satisfying IM.
Proof. The statement (1) follows immediately from Lemma 3.1. We prove
the statement (2). Suppose F 2 Φ¤ satisﬁes IM. Then we can ﬁnd a bar-
gaining problem S 2 Σ such that there is an element u in SPO(S) with
u1 + u2 > F1(S) + F2(S). Then there exists another bargaining solution
G 2 Φ¤ which satisﬁes IM and represented by a monotonic curve f¸G(s)g
with u 2 f¸G(s)g and ¸G(s0) À ¸G(s) for any s0 > s. Note that




SG du1 du2 >
RR







Therefore, if we restrict the class of bargaining problems that we consider
to the symmetric ones, we can say that K
r
> F for all the other F 2 Φ¤
satisfying IM.
Let ˆ Σ, as a subset of Σ, denote the family of bargaining problems taking




Proof. If K(S) = N(S), then
RR
SK du1 du2 ¸
RR
SN du1 du2, with the equality
holding if and only if S 2 ˆ Σ. Suppose now that K(S) 6= N(S) (see Figure 3).
10-
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Figure 3: Nash Solution and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
We assume h(S) = (1;1) thanks to SI of both solutions. Since both so-
lutions are strongly Pareto-optimal, we assume without loss of generality that










Since N1(S) 6= 1,
Z Z






























Figure 4: A Partial Ordering of Bargaining Solutions
Figure 4 summarizes what we have found from the comparisons of bar-
gaining solutions. The discrete Raiﬀa solution should be also located between
the Nash solution and the DAA solutions.
We conclude this section by showing the relations between the axiom of
DAA and other axioms. The following axiom, which requires a solution to
be sensitive to a twisting of bargaining problem, is studied in the literature,
and found closely related with an axiom of risk sensitivity (Thomson and
Myerson (1980) and Tijs and Peters (1985)).
² Twist Sensitivity (TW): If (1) F(S) 2 WPO(T), (2) u 2 T n S
implies ui > Fi(S), and (3) u 2 S nT implies ui · Fi(S), then Fi(T) ¸
Fi(S) and Fj(T) · Fj(S).
The Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisfy TW, but not
DAA. The Perles-Maschler solution satisﬁes DAA, but not TW. We introduce
a stricter version of this axiom.
² Strict Twist Sensitivity (STW): If (1) S 6= T, (2) F(S) 2 WPO(T),
(3) u 2 T nS implies ui > Fi(S), and (4) u 2 S nT implies ui · Fi(S),
then either Fi(T) > Fi(S) or [Fi(T) = Fi(S) and Fj(T) < Fj(S)].
The axiom of STW states that if the set of alternatives is twisted favorably
to one person, that person should be strictly better oﬀ wherever possible.
Note that STW implies TW. We show that STW implies DAA.
Proposition 3.4 If a bargaining solution in Φ satisﬁes STW, then it satis-
ﬁes DAA.
12Proof. We prove the contrapositive of this statement. Suppose F 2 Φ does
not satisfy DAA. Then, for some S 2 Σ, there exists a proper subset T 2 Σ
such that F(S0) = F(S) for any S0 2 fS0 2 Σ : T µ S0 µ Sg. Among such
S0, there exists a bargaining problem R 2 Σ with R µ S, R 6= S such that
u 2 S n R implies ui > Fi(S) for some i. However, F(R) = F(S), which
implies F does not satisfy STW.
However, DAA does not necessarily imply STW, as we see in the coun-
terexample of the Perles-Maschler solution.
4 Average Alternative Solutions
In the previous section, we have shown that most well-known classical solu-
tions, including the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, do
not satisfy DAA, not to mention STW. One can easily see that the egalitar-
ian solution and the utilitarian solution do not satisfy DAA, either. Then
a natural question arising from it is what bargaining solutions satisfy DAA.
The Perles-Maschler solution satisﬁes DAA, but not STW. One can also see
that the area monotonic solution satisﬁes STW, and therefore DAA. In this
section, we show that there are numerous other solutions that satisfy DAA
and STW.
We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions based on averages of all
the alternatives. Let ¹ be a continuous function from I R
2
+ to I R+ such that RR
T ¹(u1;u2)du1 du2 > 0 for any bounded open set T ½ I R
2
+. We deﬁne the














S ¹(u1;u2)du1 du2. a¹(S) is the expectation of a continuous
random vector that takes a probability density function of 1
C¹(u1;u2) over
S. For each ¹, a bargaining solution is deﬁned on Σ as the maximal point
of S on the straight line passing through (0;0) and a¹(S).3 We denote this
3Thomson (1981) uses the average alternative (center of gravity) as a reference function
to reformulate Nash’s IIA, and derives a diﬀerent type of bargaining solution. This solution
does not satisfy DAA.
13solution by A¹, and call it ¹-average alternative solution or simply av-
erage alternative solution. For ¹ = u1, u2, u1u2, etc., we write Au1, Au2,
Au1u2, etc. Particularly, if ¹ is a positive constant C, we denote the average
alternative solution by AC or simply A. By this construction, all the average
alternative solutions satisfy WPO. One can easily see that they satisfy STW,
and therefore DAA as well.
example Consider a bargaining problem S ´ cchf(2;0);(1;1)g. We show
the solution outcomes for well-known classical solutions and average alterna-
tive solutions (see Figure 5). N(S) = (1;1), K(S) = (4
3; 2
3), PM(S) = (3
2; 1
2),
Rd(S) = EA(S) = (5
4; 3
4), A(S) = (14
11; 8












































Figure 5: average alternative Solutions
In the following two lemmas, we show the associated conditions on ¹ in
order for an average alternative solution to satisfy certain properties.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose there exists a function g : I R
2
+ ! I R+ with g(1;1) = 1
such that ¹(®1u1;®2u2) = g(®1;®2)¹(u1;u2) for any ®1;®2 > 0. Then, an
average alternative solution A¹(S) satisﬁes SI.
14Proof. Let u1 = fS(u2) denote the equation representing the graph of














































































































for all S 2 Σ and for all ®1;®2 > 0.





real numbers k1;k2 > ¡1. The following lemma shows the necessary and
suﬃcient condition on ¹ for an average alternative solution to satisfy the
axiom of symmetry stated below.
² Symmetry (SYM):
If (u1;u2) 2 S implies (u2;u1) 2 S, then F1(S) = F2(S).
Lemma 4.2 An average alternative solution A¹(S) satisﬁes SYM if and only
if
¹(u1;u2) = ¹(u2;u1) for all (u1;u2) 2 I R
2
+:
Proof. The “if” part of this proposition is trivial. Now, we prove the “only
if” part. We ﬁrst prove by contradiction a claim that if A¹(S) satisﬁes SYM







u2¹(u1;u2)du1 du2 for all symmetric S 2 Σ:






u1¹(u2;u1)du1 du2 for all symmetric S 2 Σ:
Suppose the claim is not true. Then, there exists a symmetric set T with RR
T du1 du2 > 0 so that ¹(u1;u2) 6= ¹(u2;u1) for all (u1;u2) 2 T. Then, we
can ﬁnd T 0 µ T with
RR
T0 du1 du2 > 0 so that either ¹(u1;u2) > ¹(u2;u1) for
all (u1;u2) 2 T 0 or ¹(u1;u2) < ¹(u2;u1) for all (u1;u2) 2 T 0. For this T 0,
either
Z Z





T0 u1¹(u1;u2)du1 du2 <
Z Z
T0 u1¹(u2;u1)du1 du2:
Now we can ﬁnd a symmetric bargaining problem S0 2 Σ so that neither
T 0 µ S0 nor T 0 µ S0c(= the complement of S0) and that
either
Z Z





S0 u1¹(u1;u2)du1 du2 <
Z Z
S0 u1¹(u2;u1)du1 du2;
which is a contradiction. This proves the claim. Finally, since ¹(u1;u2) =
¹(u2;u1) almost everywhere and ¹ is continuous, we conclude that ¹(u1;u2) =
¹(u2;u1) for all (u1;u2) 2 I R
2
+.
Therefore, if ¹ = (u1u2)k for some real number k > ¡1, an average alter-
native solution A¹(S) satisﬁes SI and SYM. Note that if ¹ satisﬁes both con-
ditions in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, then any average alternative solution
A¹(S) satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM, and the property called weak independence
of irrelevant alternatives, which is deﬁned in Thomson and Myerson (1980).
We introduce a new axiom, called “moment monotonicity”. Let d(u;F(S))
denote the distance between the point u and the straight line passing through
(0;0) and F(S). Let [T n S]i denote fu : u 2 T n S; ui > Fi(S)g.
² Moment Monotonicity (MON): If T ¶ S, F(S) 2 WPO(T), and RR
[TnS]i d(u;F(S))du1 du2 >
RR
[TnS]j d(u;F(S))du1 du2 for j 6= i, then
Fi(T) ¸ Fi(S).
16Note that [T nS]i is the set of additional alternatives which are preferred
to F(S) by player i. This axiom requires that player i should not be treated
worse if the set of additional alternatives favorable to player i outweighs the
set of additional alternatives favorable to the other player. When comparing
the contributions of the additional alternatives, the distance (how favorable)
as well as the area (how large) is considered. Therefore, the above axiom is
diﬀerent from the axiom of area monotonicity (Anbarci and Bigelow (1994)),
which only considers the area. For example, consider Figure 6. According to
the axiom of moment monotonicity, additional alternatives around w (open
ball with a center w and a radius r) should contribute more to the determi-
nation of the solution outcome than additional alternatives around v (open
ball with a center v and the same radius r). According to the axiom of area































fu : u 2 T n S; u1 > F1(S)g
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Figure 6: Moment Monotonicity
We can generalize the axiom of moment monotonicity to ¹-moment mono-
17tonicity. The axiom of moment monotonicity is a special case where ¹ is
constant.
² ¹-Moment Monotonicity (¹-MON): If T ¶ S, F(S) 2 WPO(T),
and
RR
[TnS]i d(u;F(S))¹(u)du1 du2 >
RR
[TnS]j d(u;F(S))¹(u)du1 du2 for
j 6= i, then Fi(T) ¸ Fi(S).
Now, we are ready to characterize average alternative solutions by com-
bining these new axioms and the standard axioms used by the Nash solution
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Lemma 4.3 If a bargaining solution F deﬁned on Σ satisﬁes WPO, SI,
SYM, and ¹-MON, then it satisﬁes SPO.
Proof. If a bargaining problem S is in ˆ Σ, then F(S) 2 SPO(S) by WPO, SI,
and SYM of F. Suppose S 2 Σ n ˆ Σ and WPO(S) 6= SPO(S). In this case,
either l1(S) > 0 or l2(S) > 0. Take S0 ´ cchf(l1(S);h2(S))g for the former
case, and take S00 ´ cchf(h1(S);l2(S))g for the latter case. Then F(S0) =
(l1(S);h2(S)) and F(S00) = (h1(S);l2(S)). Therefore, F(S) 2 SPO(S) by
¹-MON of F.
Proposition 4.1 Let ¹ be (u1u2)k for some real number k > ¡1. Then,
the average alternative solution A¹ is the only bargaining solution on Σ that
satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM and ¹-MON.
Proof. It is clear that A¹ satisﬁes WPO, SI, and SYM. In order to see
that A¹ satisﬁes ¹-MON, suppose that T ¶ S and A¹(S) 2 WPO(T).
If either [T n S]1 or [T n S]2 is empty, we are done. Otherwise, suppose RR
[TnS]1 d(u;A¹(S))¹(u)du1 du2 >
RR




























































Now, we show there is no other solution satisfying WPO, SI, SYM, and
¹-MON. Suppose F satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM, and ¹-MON. Then F and
A¹ satisfy SPO by Lemma 4.3. Take an aﬃne transformation ¿ so that
A¹(¿(S)) = (1;1). Note that (1;1) is in SPO(¿(S)) by SPO of A¹. Let u be
any element in WPO(¿(S)) with u2 < 1. Then, F(cchfug) = u by WPO, SI,
and SYM of F (or by SPO of F), and F2(¿(S)) ¸ u2 by ¹-MON of F. Now,
let v be any element in WPO(¿(S)) with v1 < 1. Then, F(cchfvg) = v by
WPO, SI and SYM of F (or by SPO of F), and F1(¿(S)) > v1 by ¹-MON
of F. Therefore, F(¿(S)) = (1;1), which implies F(¿(S)) = A¹(¿(S)). Using
SI of F and A¹, we conclude that F(S) = A¹(S) for all S 2 Σ.
We show that the axioms WPO, SI, SYM, and ¹-MON are logically in-
dependent in Appendix A.
5 Limits of Average Alternative Solutions
Finally, we show two results on the limits of average alternative solutions.
The following propositions show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution can be obtained as limits, even though they are distinct from the
average alternative solutions in their constructions.
Proposition 5.1 For any S 2 Σ, limk!1 A(u1u2)k(S) = N(S).
Proof. Take an aﬃne transformation ¿ so that N(¿(S)) = (1;1). Let S0
denote fu 2 S : u · 1g, S1 denote fu 2 S : u1 ¸ 1g, and S2 denote fu 2 S :
u2 ¸ 1g. Let C denote
RR





S1 ¹(u1;u2)du1 du2, and C2 denote
RR



























































C = 1, and 0 · C0
C ; C1
C ; C2























































































! 1 for a non-empty S1. Consider a set
























k+1 du2 ¡ 1
(k+1)(k+2)








! 1 as k ! 1.
Proposition 5.2 For any S 2 Σ, limk!¡1+ A(u1u2)k(S) = K(S).
Proof. We prove it by showing that the monotonic bounds of the average
alternative solutions shrink to the monotonic curve of the Kalai-Smorodinsky









































0 [u1(¡(1 ¡ s)u1 + 1)]k+1 du1
sk+2
k+2 + (1 ¡ s)
R 1
0 [u1(¡(1 ¡ s)u1 + 1)]k+1 du1
! 1 (as k ! ¡1
+):







! 1 as k ! ¡1+. Therefore,
for any bargaining problem S 2 Σ, A(u1u2)k(S) ! K(S) as k ! ¡1+.
The two limit theorems lead us to provide alternative characterizations
for the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Consider the
following axiom.
² (u1u2)1-Monotonicity ((u1u2)1-MON): If T ¶ S, F(S) 2 WPO(T),
and there exists u 2 [TnS]i such that u1F2(S)+u2F1(S) > 2F1(S)F2(S),
then Fi(T) ¸ Fi(S).
This axiom requires that player i should not be treated worse if the set
of additional alternatives favorable to player i contains an alternative bet-
ter than the current solution outcome in terms of the weighted sum, with
the weights given by the current solution outcome. There is no necessary
implications between this axiom and the axiom of IIA. Consider a class of
bargaining solutions fNs=˜ s : ˜ s 2 [0;1)g, deﬁned on Σ as follows:
Ns=˜ s =
(
(˜ sh1(S);h2(S)) if S 2 ˆ Σ
N(S) otherwise:
These solutions satisfy (u1u2)1-MON, but do not satisfy IIA. A class of
bargaining solutions fF t : t 2 (0; 1
2) [ (1
2;1)g as deﬁned in Proposition 3.1
satisfy IIA, but do not satisfy (u1u2)1-MON.
Proposition 5.3 The Nash solution N is the only bargaining solution on Σ
that satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM and (u1u2)1-MON.
Proof. It is clear that N satisﬁes WPO, SI, and SYM. In order to see that
N satisﬁes (u1u2)1-MON, suppose that T ¶ S, N(S) 2 WPO(T), and there
exists u 2 [T nS]i such that u1F2(S)+u2F1(S) > 2F1(S)F2(S). If there exists
v such that v1v2 > F1(S)F2(S), then v should be an element in [T nS]i. This
implies Fi(T) > Fi(S). If there does not exist v such that v1v2 > F1(S)F2(S),
then Fi(T) = Fi(S) by the deﬁnition of the Nash solution.
Now, we show there is no other solution satisfying WPO, SI, SYM, and
(u1u2)1-MON. Suppose F satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM, and (u1u2)1-MON. Take
an aﬃne transformation ¿ so that N(¿(S)) = (1;1). Note that (1;1) is in
21SPO(¿(S)) by SPO of N. Let u be any element in WPO(¿(S)) with u2 < 1.
Then, F(cchfug) = u by WPO, SI, and SYM of F, and F2(¿(S)) ¸ u2 by
(u1u2)1-MON of F. Now, let v be any element in WPO(¿(S)) with v1 < 1.
Then, F(cchfvg) = v by WPO, SI and SYM of F, and F1(¿(S)) > v1 by
(u1u2)1-MON of F. Therefore, F(¿(S)) = (1;1), which implies F(¿(S)) =
N(¿(S)). Using SI of F and N, we conclude that F(S) = N(S) for all S 2 Σ.
It can be shown that the characterizing axioms are logically independent.
Now, consider the following axiom.
² (u1u2)¡1-Monotonicity ((u1u2)¡1-MON): If T ¶ S, F(S) 2 WPO(T),
and hi(T) ¡ hi(S) > hj(T) ¡ hj(S) for j 6= i, then Fi(T) ¸ Fi(S).
This axiom requires that player i should not be treated worse if the highest
level of utility for player i increases more than for the other player. There is
no necessary implications between this axiom and the axiom of IM. Consider
a class of bargaining solutions fD¤





(˜ sh1(S);h2(S)) if S 2 ˆ Σ
D¤
1(S) otherwise:
These solutions satisfy (u1u2)¡1-MON, but do not satisfy IM. Any bargaining
solution F 2 Φ satisfying IM and the following conditions does not satisfy
(u1u2)¡1-MON.







Proposition 5.4 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K is the only bargaining
solution on Σ that satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM and (u1u2)¡1-MON.
Proof. It is clear that N satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM, and (u1u2)¡1-MON.
Now, we show there is no other solution satisfying WPO, SI, SYM, and
(u1u2)¡1-MON. Suppose F satisﬁes WPO, SI, SYM, and (u1u2)¡1-MON.
Take an aﬃne transformation ¿ so that K(¿(S)) = (1;1). Note that h1(¿(S)) =
h2(¿(S)) and that (1;1) is in SPO(¿(S)) by SPO of K. Let u be any element
in WPO(¿(S)) with u2 < 1. Then, F(cchfug) = u by WPO, SI, and SYM
of F, and F2(¿(S)) ¸ u2 by (u1u2)¡1-MON of F. Now, let v be any element
22in WPO(¿(S)) with v1 < 1. Then, F(cchfvg) = v by WPO, SI and SYM of
F, and F1(¿(S)) > v1 by (u1u2)¡1-MON of F. Therefore, F(¿(S)) = (1;1),
which implies F(¿(S)) = K(¿(S)). Using SI of F and K, we conclude that
F(S) = K(S) for all S 2 Σ.
It can be shown that the characterizing axioms are logically independent.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to analyze diﬀerent bargaining solutions from the
viewpoint of the relevance of alternatives. At one extreme in the partial
ordering are there the IIA solutions leaving a large proportion of the alterna-
tives as irrelevant. At the opposite extreme are there numerous bargaining
solutions, including the average alternative solutions, that use all the alter-
natives to determine the solution outcome.
Even though the average alternative solutions are distinct from the Nash
solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in their constructions, a certain
class of average alternative solutions lies as a bridge between the two limits,
Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
23APPENDIX
A Logical Independence of Characterizing Ax-
ioms
Let ¹ be (u1u2)k for some real number k > ¡1. The axioms of WPO, SI,
SYM, and ¹-MON are logically independent. That is, no axiom is redun-
dant in the characterization of an average alternative solution A¹ in Propo-
sition 4.1.
² The Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisfy WPO,
SI, and SYM. However, they do not satisfy ¹-MON.
Let S be cchf(1;1)g. For any given ¹ = (u1u2)k with k > ¡1, one can
ﬁnd T = cchf(2 ¡ ²;0);(1 ¡ ² + ²2;1 + ²)g with ² a small positive real
number, in order to show the Nash solution does not satisfy ¹-MON.
Let S be cchf(1;0);(2
3; 2
3);(0;1)g. For any given ¹ = (u1u2)k with
k > ¡1, one can ﬁnd T = cchf(1; 1¡²
2 );(0;1+²)g with ² a small positive
real number, in order to show the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution does not
satisfy ¹-MON.
² Consider a class of bargaining solutions fA
¹






(˜ sh1(S);h2(S)) if S 2 ˆ Σ
A¹(S) otherwise:
These solutions satisfy WPO, SI, ¹-MON, but not SYM.
² The egalitarian solution satisﬁes WPO, SYM, and ¹-MON. However,
it does not satisfy SI.
² Consider a class of bargaining solutions fA
¹




t=˜ t(S) = ˜ tA
¹(S) + (1 ¡ ˜ t)(0;0):
These solutions satisfy SI, SYM, ¹-MON, but not WPO.
24B Monotonic Bounds
In this section, we introduce the concept of monotonic bounds, which describe
bounds of the solution outcomes for twist sensitive classical solutions. Let














Now, the following three propositions (Propositions B.1 - B.3) show the prop-
erties of the monotonic bounds.
Proposition B.1 For any bargaining solution F 2 Φ satisfying TW, all of
the following statements hold true.
(1) For all s;s0 such that s0 > s, ¸1
F(s0) ¸ ¸1




(2) For all t;t0 such that t0 > t, ¸2
F(t0) ¸ ¸2





F(s) is continuous everywhere except at s such that ¸1
F1(s) = 1. If F
satisﬁes SPO additionally, then ¸1
F(s) is continuous everywhere.
(4) ¸2
F(t) is continuous everywhere except at t such that ¸2
F2(t) = 1. If F
satisﬁes SPO additionally, then ¸2
F(t) is continuous everywhere.
(5) For any S 2 Σ with h(S) = (1;1), there is at least one element in
WPO(S)\f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g. If F satisﬁes SPO additionally, then there is
only one element in SPO(S) \ f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g.
(6) For any S 2 Σ with h(S) = (1;1), there is at least one element in
WPO(S)\f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g. If F satisﬁes SPO additionally, then there is
only one element in SPO(S) \ f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g.
Proof. We prove only the statements (1), (3), and (5) because of the
symmetry of the statements. Let S denote cchf(1;s);(0;1)g and S0 de-
note cchf(1;s0);(0;1)g. Consider a transformation ¿2 such that F(S) 2
SPO(¿2(S0)). By TW of F, we obtain F1(¿2(S0)) ¸ F1(S), which im-
plies F1(S0) ¸ F1(S). Now consider a transformation ¿1 such that F(S) 2
25WPO(¿1(S0)). Again, by TW of F, we obtain F2(¿1(S0)) ¸ F2(S). This
implies F2(S0) ¸ F2(S). Therefore, we have F(S0) ¸ F(S). That is,
¸1
F(s0) ¸ ¸1
F(s). This proves the statement (1). Since the statement (1)
holds true for any s0 > s arbitrarily close each other, the statements (3)
follows. The statement (5) is a straightforward result of the statements (1)
and (3).
If a classical solution satisﬁes the axiom of symmetry in addition to TW,
then the monotonic bounds are also symmetric with respect to the 45± line.
If a classical solution satisﬁes SPO and IM in addition to TW, then the
monotonic bounds shrink to a curve (for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the
monotonic bounds degenerate to the straight line segment connecting (1
2; 1
2)
and (1;1)). This curve is exactly the monotonic curve presented in Peters
and Tijs (1985). So, the monotonic curve can be viewed as a special case of
the monotonic bounds. For the IIA solutions F t : t 2 [0;1], the monotonic
bounds take a form of the boundary of a rectangle with vertices (t;1 ¡ t),
(1;1¡t), (1;1), and (t;1). For dictatorial solutions F 0(= D¤
1) and F 1(= D¤
2)
in particular, the monotonic bounds take a form of a straight line segment.
For the dictatorial solutions D1 and D2, the monotonic bounds shrink even
further to a point: f(1;0)g and f(0;1)g respectively. The monotonic bounds
of some well-known solutions are illustrated in Figure 8.
Now, we show additional properties of the monotonic bounds for the
classical solutions satisfying SPO and TW. For any such solution, let ˆ u denote
the unique element in SPO(S)\f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g, and ˆ v denote SPO(S)\
f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g.
Proposition B.2 For any bargaining solution F 2 Φ satisfying SPO and
TW and for any bargaining problem S 2 Σ, we have
ˆ v1 · F1(S) · ˆ u1 and ˆ u2 · F2(S) · ˆ v2.
Proof. Let Sˆ u denote cchf(1;s);(0;1)g with F(cchf(1;s);(0;1)g) = ˆ u and
Sˆ v denote cchf(1;0);(t;1)g with F(cchf(1;0);(t;1)g) = ˆ v (see Figure 7).
Consider bargaining problems S and Sˆ u. By TW of F, we have F1(S) ·
F1(Sˆ u) ´ ˆ u1 and F2(S) ¸ F2(Sˆ u) ´ ˆ u2. Also, consider S and Sˆ v. By TW of
F, we have F1(S) ¸ F1(Sˆ v) ´ ˆ v1 and F2(S) · F2(Sˆ v) ´ ˆ v2.
Bounds can be found for the twist-sensitive classical solutions that do
































Figure 7: Monotonic Bounds
then f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g always lies in the right lower side of f¸2
F(t) : t 2
[0;1]g. They may coincide, but never cross. Figure 8 panel (f) shows that
f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g lies in the left upper side of f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g for the
Perles-Maschler solution, which does not satisfy TW.
Now, we show additional properties of the monotonic bounds for the
classical solutions satisfying STW, a stronger axiom than TW.
Proposition B.3 For any bargaining solution F 2 Φ satisfying STW, all of
the following statements hold true.






















(3) For any S 2 Σ,
there are exactly two elements in f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g \ f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g.
They are F(cchf(1;0);(0;1)g) and F(cchf(1;1)g).
Proof. Since the statements (1) and (2) are symmetric, we prove only (1).
Let S and S0 denote cchf(1;s);(0;1)g and cchf(1;s0);(0;1)g respectively.
Consider a transformation ¿2 such that F(S) 2 SPO(¿2(S0)). By STW of
F, F1(S0) = F1(¿2(S0)) > F1(S) if F1(S) < 1, and F1(S0) = F1(¿2(S0)) =
F1(S) if F1(S) = 1. Now consider a transformation ¿1 such that F(S) 2
WPO(¿1(S0)). Again, by STW of F, F2(S0) = F2(¿1(S0)) > F2(S) if F2(S) <
1, and F2(S0) = F2(¿1(S0)) = F2(S) if F2(S) = 1. However, F2(S) 6= 1 since
F(cchf(1;0);(0;1)g) 6= (0;1) (by SI and STW of F) and s < 1. This implies
F2(S0) > F2(S). Therefore, we have
F(S0) À F(S) if F(S) ¿ 1;











This proves the statements (1) and (2).
Now, we prove the statement (3). It is clear that F(cchf(1;0);(0;1)g) and
F(cchf(1;1)g) are elements of f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g \ f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g. The
statements (1) and (2) together implies that if there is another element in
f¸1
F(s) : s 2 [0;1]g \ f¸2
F(t) : t 2 [0;1]g, it should be in the interior of
convf(1;0);(1;1);(0;1)g. Suppose that w is such an element. Then there
exist two bargaining problems whose solution outcome is w. One takes a
form of cchf(1;s);(0;1)g for some s 2 (0;1). The other takes a form of
cchf(1;0);(t;1)g for some t 2 (0;1). Then, this contradicts to F satisfying
STW since one bargaining problem is obtained from a twisting of the other.
28We conclude this section by showing an application of the properties of
the monotonic bounds. The following axiom of “midpoint domination”, also
referred to as “symmetric monotonicity”, requires the bargainers to obtain a
utility at least as well as the average of their preferred positions.
² Midpoint Domination (MD): F(S) ¸ 1
2(h1(S);h2(S)).
Sobel (1981) showed SPO, SYM4, and an axiom of risk sensitivity together
implies MD. His result holds true only if the considered class of solutions
satisfy SPO(S) = WPO(S), as was assumed in his paper. However, without
this assumption, the combination of SPO, SI, SYM, and the axiom of risk
sensitivity is not enough to guarantee MD. See the following example.





(0;h2(S)) if l1(S) = 0 and l2(S) > 0;
(h1(S);0) if l1(S) > 0 and l2(S) = 0;
PM(S) otherwise:
This solution F satisﬁes SPO, SI, SYM, and the axiom of risk sensitivity.











We show combinations of axioms suﬃcient to guarantee MD.5
Corollary B.1 If a bargaining solution in Φ satisﬁes TW and SYM, then it
satisﬁes MD.
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2.
4One can easily see that the axiom of SYM is not necessary. A weaker condition
F(cchf(1;0);(0;1)g) = (1
2; 1
2) can substitute SYM.
5Tijs and Peters (1985) showed that an axiom of twist sensitivity implies an axiom of
risk sensitivity, and is equivalent to the combination of the axiom of risk sensitivity and





































































































(f) Perles-Maschler Solution, PM








Figure 8: Monotonic Bounds of Bargaining Solutions
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